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A reporting standard for defined 
contribution pension plans
Pension regulators stress the need for plan members to 
receive information allowing them to monitor their future 
pension wealth and the investment risk they bear. This 
paper by Kees de Vaan (Syntrus Achmea), Daniele Fano 
(Tor Vergata University), Herialt Mens (Aegon) and Giovanna 
Nicodano (University of Turin) proposes a simple method 
for projecting DC pension benefits at retirement on a yearly 
basis, which may be a building block towards an industry 
reporting standard. They discuss two reporting formats, one 
based on accumulated capital at retirement and the other 
on monthly pension wage.
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preface
Netspar seeks to stimulate debate on the effects of aging on the 
behavior of men and women, (such as what and how they save), 
on the sustainability of their pensions, and on government policy. 
The baby boom generation is approaching retirement age, so the 
number of people aged 65 and over will grow fast in the coming 
decades. People generally lead healthier lives and grow older, 
families have fewer children. Aging is often viewed in a bad light 
since the number of people over 65 years old may well double 
compared to the population between 20 and 65. Will the working 
population still be able to earn what is needed to accommodate a 
growing number of retirees? Must people make more hours during 
their working career and retire at a later age? Or should pensions 
be cut or premiums increased in order to keep retirement benefits 
affordable? Should people be encouraged to take personal 
initiative to ensure an adequate pension? And what is the role of 
employers’ and workers’ organizations in arranging a collective 
pension? Are people able to and prepared to personally invest for 
their retirement money, or do they rather leave that to pension 
funds? Who do pension fund assets actually belong to? And 
how can a level playing field for pension funds and insurers be 
defined? How can the solidarity principle and individual wishes 
be reconciled? But most of all, how can the benefits of longer and 
healthier lives be used to ensure a happier and affluent society?
For many reasons there is need for a debate on the consequences 
of aging. We do not always know the exact consequences of 
aging. And the consequences that are nonetheless clear deserve 
8to be made known to a larger public. More important of course 
is that many of the choices that must be made have a political 
dimension, and that calls for a serious debate. After all, in the 
public spectrum these are very relevant and topical subjects that 
young and old people are literally confronted with.
For these reasons Netspar has initiated Design Papers. What a 
Netspar Design Paper does is to analyze an element or aspect of a 
pension product or pension system. That may include investment 
policy, the shaping of the payment process, dealing with the 
uncertainties of life expectancy, use of the personal home for 
one’s retirement provision, communication with pension scheme 
members, the options menu for members, governance models, 
supervision models, the balance between capital funding and 
pay-as-you-go, a flexible job market for older workers, and the 
pension needs of a heterogeneous population. A Netspar Design 
Paper analyzes the purpose of a product or an aspect of the 
pension system, and it investigates possibilities of improving the 
way they function. Netspar Design Papers focus in particular on 
specialists in the sector who are responsible for the design of the 
component.
Roel Beetsma
Chairman of the Netspar Editorial Board
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a reporting standard for 
defined contribution pension 
plans
Abstract
Pension regulators stress the need for plan members to receive 
information allowing them to monitor their future pension wealth 
and the investment risk they bear. This paper proposes a simple 
method for projecting DC pension benefits at retirement on a 
yearly basis, which may be a building block towards an industry 
reporting standard. Projections highlight how the current choice 
of asset allocation impacts retirement outcomes, and the results 
are compared with a money-back benchmark to clarify the 
trade-off between risk and return. Projections are also connected 
with ex post performance, in that the pension fund reports its 
yearly-realized performance relative to previous projections. The 
fund also revises its current forecasts of benefits at retirement as 
a function of its own realized returns. We discuss two reporting 
formats, one based on accumulated capital at retirement and the 
other on monthly pension wage.
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1. Introduction 
Defined contribution pension plans around the world report 
their performance in non-homogeneous ways to their members. 
When such reports are present, a common feature they have is 
a focus on the returns obtained in the recent past. This practice 
does not necessarily convey information on longer-term returns, 
even if investment in a pension fund is for the long run. On the 
one hand, returns on certain assets may be close to unpredictable 
– in which case their past returns do not forecast future ones. 
On the other hand, projecting future outcomes given past 
performance is likely to exceed the household’s ability, even if 
the pension fund invested in assets with predictable returns. 
Even when longer-term performance figures are disclosed, the 
mere representation of past realized returns does not necessarily 
help the pension members revise their expectation on the range 
of future pension benefits, and on how possible outcomes may 
depend on alternative asset allocations and levels of contribution. 
As a consequence, the way that information is currently reported 
does not provide an answer to the two basic questions for the 
DC plan investor: i.e., to what extent can an investment plan 
contribute to retirement income, and what are the risks involved? 
 A further issue is represented by the lack of homogeneity 
in the nature of DC pension entitlements across countries. In 
some countries such, as the Netherlands, full annuitization at 
retirement is compulsory, while in other countries, such as the 
USA, annuitization is but an option. There are also intermediate 
cases, such as Italy, where annuitization is compulsory only for 
50% of the capital accumulated. 
 This paper proposes a method for projecting (given some 
contribution installments) pension benefits in future years until 
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retirement in a way that provides the plan member information 
about the trade-off between higher returns and higher risk 
taking, with reference to both prospective accumulated capital 
and prospective annuities. It then explains how the pension 
fund may report its recent realized performance, by revising its 
projections of benefits as a function of its own actual returns and 
comparing them with previous projections. Finally, the paper 
presents a simple example of disclosure of this information. 
Our proposal has three main features: 
a) both projections and performance reporting refer to the 
retirement horizon of the plan member; 
b) ex post realized performance is assessed against an easy-to-
grasp benchmark; 
c) ex post realized performance is assessed against the pension 
fund’s previous projections.
The first characteristic, “mark-to-retirement”, stands in sharp 
contrast with current commonly used reporting methods. Drawing 
investors’ attention towards longer-term performance and goals 
may help improve their ability to allocate their savings. This 
longer-horizon perspective may indeed counter the investor’s 
tendency to pour money into funds with high past returns at 
monthly or quarterly frequencies (Del Guercio and Tkac; 2002, 
Rakowski and Wang, 2009), and more generally to poorly time the 
market, which reduces their average returns (Friesen and Sapp, 
2007). Last but not least, this approach makes it easier to assess 
the appropriateness of an installment plan, both in terms of the 
amount of money and of the time horizon.
 The second contribution of our framework is represented by 
the benchmark against which pension fund performance should 
be evaluated, i.e. a purchasing power equivalent, real terms 
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money-back indicator. We depart from benchmarks currently used 
(Lehmann and Timmermann, 2008), which juxtapose realized 
fund returns to a portfolio with a comparable basket of securities 
in terms of risk exposure, and lead to different ex-post rankings 
of fund performance depending on the risk adjustment. Our 
proposed benchmark is close to the maturity-matched Inflation 
Indexed Bonds (IIB), considered as riskless securities for a 
long-term investor with the same investment horizon as the bond 
maturity (see Bodie and Treussard, 2007). Projections against a 
riskless comparable allow plan members to appreciate the upside 
potential of risky assets, at the same time making them aware 
of their downside risk. Clearly, the benchmark we propose (the 
CPI) may be easier to beat for the pension fund than a portfolio 
of inflation-linked bonds that provide, in normal circumstances, 
a real interest rate besides the indexation to inflation of the 
principal. Primarily, however, our benchmark is easier to project, 
considering that the CPI index is one of the most established 
statistics, while returns on IIBs – which ought to be applied to 
contributions in order to mark-to-retirement the benchmark 
return – depend on both inflation and real interest rates and 
also, ultimately, on the availability, for each country, of reliable 
inflation-linked bond performance indices. 
 The third feature of our proposal requires the fund to contrast 
realized risk-return performance against its own previous 
projections associated with a given asset allocation. The more 
optimistic the ex ante projections, the worse the current 
performance will appear relative to expected outcomes. This 
feature disciplines pension fund managers when making initial 
projections, as plan members may leave the fund ex post if 
faced with blatant inconsistencies. We recommend that such an 
exercise be performed annually, although longer-term ex-post 
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performance reports on a five- or ten- year basis would easily fit 
in our proposed framework.
 Reporting standards are not new to the financial industry. 
The GIPS (2006) standard gives the pension providers and the 
asset management industry paradigms that allow for ex-post 
portfolio performance comparisons to be made on a fair and 
straightforward basis and on a level playing field. This paper 
is a starting point towards the design of a reporting standard 
for pension plans and, more generally, for long-term financial 
investment plans. This reporting standard would complement 
GIPS with a focus on intertemporal longer-term financial 
investment assessments. With a similar angle, a recent paper 
by the Group of Thirty (2013) states that “accounting methods 
that embed a short-term horizon are a potential impediment 
to long-term finance. Given this, it is worthwhile considering 
a range of options for accounting methods. …we describe just 
one of many potential options, and include it as an example for 
consideration rather than as a formal proposal. This approach … 
we call target-date accounting…”
 An OECD-World Bank study that analyzes performance reporting 
by DC pension funds (Antolin et al., 2010) suggests a method to 
communicate the trade-off between risk and return at retirement 
(Viceira, 2010), and a benchmark for their performance evaluation 
(Bagliano, Fugazza and Nicodano, 2010). Our proposal departs 
from previous ones in two main ways. First, it combines in an 
integrated framework both periodic performance evaluation and 
longer-term risk return projections. Secondly, it focuses on the 
design of a relatively simple reporting standard to be adopted by 
the pension and asset management industries. 
 Traditional performance evaluation scrutinizes managerial skills 
such as security selection and market timing that allow pension 
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fund managers to systematically earn risk-adjusted returns above 
the market returns (Lehmann and Timmerman, 2008). Several 
empirical papers analyze whether such abilities persist over time 
(i.e. whether past abnormal returns predict future abnormal 
returns). Here, performance evaluation investigates whether the 
strategic asset allocation, together with the chosen contribution 
path, allows managers (a) to at least return the purchasing power 
of contributions (b) to reach a desired monthly pension payment. 
Indeed, our example even assumes away return predictability – 
thereby ruling out the very possibility for asset managers to obtain 
abnormal returns; and for past performance to predict future 
performance. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 below 
describes our base proposal for a reporting framework, in real 
terms. Section 3 projects a monthly pension equivalent instead 
of accumulated capital, which may help plan members to 
understand the reports better. Section 4 discusses alternative 
inflation and wage growth scenarios. Our work adopts several 
simplifying assumptions, but Section 5 indicates possible 
extensions. Appendix A addresses the sensitivity of monthly 
pension projections to interest rate volatility. Appendix B explains 
how to report in current euro. 
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2. A mark-to-retirement reporting framework 
Our reporting framework is composed of a limited number of 
figures and tables, along with a model to produce them. 
 Figure 1 below shows the type of asset allocation across time 
underlying the model.
 Figure 2 reports the possible values of pension assets at 
retirement (time T) against an easy-to-grasp benchmark, at 
current purchasing power. This picture is prepared at the time 
the pension member joins the fund (time 0), under assumptions 
concerning the distribution of asset returns as specified below. 
 Figure 3 reports the possible values of pension assets and of the 
benchmark after one year (time 1), highlighting the realized value 
of pension assets. This picture allows the investor to compare the 
realized return against the pension fund’s initial projections. 
 Figure 4 repeats the simulation of the distribution of pension 
assets at retirement, starting from their current (time 1) realized 
value1. Table I gathers all maintained assumptions. Tables II and 
III report some summary statistics concerning, respectively, time 
0 and time 1 projections. The last two figures, along with the last 
two tables, will be updated every year. They can be interpreted as 
mark-to-market and mark-to-retirement, respectively.
 Figure A1 shows wage payments in retirement, and the 
replacement rates. It represents the translation of the above 
accumulated capital in an annuity, conditional on the level of 
interest rates and given a set of standard actuarial assumptions.
The model is characterized by the following choices, as 
summarized in Table 1: the asset menu, which should coincide 
with the menu adopted by the pension fund; the return 
1 As will become clear later, we are still using time 0 euro.
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distribution; the asset allocation; the contribution profile; the 
benchmark; the treatment of transaction costs; real wage growth; 
and a set of parameters. 
 In our example, only “stocks” (high-risk assets) and 
“fixed-maturity bonds” (low-risk assets) belong to the asset 
menu. We allow real stock returns to be log-normally distributed 
with known mean and variance, as is customary in the literature 
on long-term asset allocation. Real bond returns are similarly 
assumed to be log-normally distributed with known correlation 
with stocks, and fixed ten- year duration. Both stock and bond 
returns are independently distributed in time. 
 We assume that the plan member contributes a monthly 
amount until retirement. Our benchmark capital is the sum of all 
contributions, capitalized at the expected inflation rate. In our 
example we assume that a 20- years- old worker contributes 100 
€ each month in the first year. With zero wage growth, benchmark 
capital at retirement is equal to 48,000 € . 
 We acknowledge the existence of both transaction costs of new 
contributions and a yearly fee levied on Assets Under Management 
(AUM). We do not compute them when projecting benchmark 
capital: in this respect, our benchmark is equivalent to a 
money-back equivalent sum in real terms. This benchmark will be 
compared with the value of accumulated assets net of costs. Thus, 
the pension fund beats the benchmark if its real return exceeds 
its costs.2 Absent any cost, the minimum real pension fund return 
needed to meet the benchmark is equal to 0%. It becomes 0.43% 
2 Pension funds often invest in mutual funds, which charge additional fees, 
instead of individual securities. These fees should not affect benchmark 
capital, either. We overlook transaction costs associated with quarterly 
rebalancing. Thus our simulations overstate pension fund return projections. 
Throughout the analysis, we do not consider distortions induced by taxation. 
We discuss other maintained assumptions in Section 4.
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to compensate yearly AUM fees equal to 0.4% (compounded 
quarterly) and transaction costs on new money, of 0.05%.3
The yearly mean real return on equities is equal to 5.5% with 
18% volatility. It is assumed to be independently distributed in 
time. The real interest rate on constant maturity bonds is 2.5% 
with volatility 3%. The correlation between risky assets and bond 
returns is set to 0.1.
 In the example shown in the first set of tables and graphs, the 
chosen asset allocation entails 20% in bonds and 80% in stocks, 
with quarterly rebalancing, as portrayed in Figure 1.
2.1 Projecting future pension assets and the risk-return 
trade-off 
This section addresses more specifically the information about 
the long-term risk return trade-off given to a new pension 
plan member, age 25, with T=40 years to retirement. Figure 2 
reports projected pension assets from age 25 to age 65 over 2,000 
possible scenarios that originate from a random drawing of stock 
and bond returns from their assumed joint distribution.
Our "money-back" benchmark, gross of fund costs, appears in 
black. Mean accumulated assets appear in white. This picture 
clearly conveys the upside potential of equity investing, together 
with its downside risk.
 The statistics at the bottom (Table II) provide some quantitative 
information. The first column indicates the probability of not 
reaching the "money-back" benchmark (3.35%) after 40 years. 
This is the observed proportion of scenarios that end up with 
accumulated assets below benchmark. The maximum shortfall 
with respect to the benchmark is equal to € -23,299.75, while the 
3 Those figures complete our example, but a regulator may want to establish a 
cost benchmark.
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average of all scenarios ending below the money-back benchmark 
is € -6,772.41. The second column reveals that the average 
amount of accumulated assets is equal to € 177,597.05, while the 
minimum equals € 24,747.04. The last four rows report upper and 
lower percentile boundary figures: these provide an idea of the 
accumulated assets associated with highly probable outcomes on 
the upside as well as on the downside. For instance, the last two 
read like “there is a 15% probability that accumulated assets will 
end below € 76,519.86; and a 5% probability they will end below 
€ 53,064.12”.
2.2 Reporting pension performance one year later 
Figure 3 allows the pension or investment plan member to 
assess the performance of her pension fund one year later. It 
highlights, with a white square, the actual ex-post accumulated 
assets against both the projected ones and the “money-back” 
benchmark in black. In the example, the gross-of-fees-and-
transaction-costs realized return is equal to -30.4%, leaving her 
with € 1,000 instead of € 1,200. Thus, the white square appears 
below the money-back benchmark. This picture does not depart 
from the logic of mark-to-market pension assets; however, it 
allows the plan participant to acknowledge that the (negative) 
performance result was among the ones considered possible 
ex-ante. 
 In other words, a plan member should understand that there 
may be large transitory deviations from the benchmark even in 
the case of a DC-plan that exactly matches an inflation-indexed 
benchmark. The plan will eventually deliver the expected return 
over the entire period because it is matched. The next section 
describes mark-to-maturity, which allows us to cast performance 
evaluation in a long-horizon perspective. 
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2.3 Updating future pension assets and the risk-return 
trade-off
Figure 4 allows the investment plan member to understand the 
implications of realized performance in a retirement perspective 
by projecting her assets to age 65, given the actual performance 
realized during the first year and her initial asset allocation. Both 
the black and the white benchmark appear clearly in Figure 4.
 Obviously, a below-mean performance after one year makes it 
less likely that the plan participant will reach the “money-back” 
benchmark (the probability increases to 3.80%, up from 3.35%, 
and the average shortfall increases from €  5361 to € 5446, as 
stated in Table III4). But mean accumulated assets are equal 
to € 179,392.88. Note that the mean accumulated assets have 
roughly remained the same as in the t=0 example. This indicates 
that a long time horizon allows for the possibility of offsetting 
initial adverse shocks, making it less sensible to deviate from 
a pre-determined investment policy. This holds true even in 
the (unreported) case of a loss of all initial contributions: the 
probability of ending below the benchmark increases to 4.3%, 
the average shortfall jumps as high as € 8006 and average 
accumulated assets fall slightly to € 175,075.
 By comparison, consider a member that starts contributing two 
years from retirement. At the beginning she expects as cumulated 
assets equal to € 2522, against a benchmark capital of € 2400. The 
probability of ending below the benchmark is high (36%) with an 
average shortfall of € 178. After all of the contributions are lost in 
the first year, the average accumulated assets fall to € 1228, well 
below the benchmark, the probability of not reaching the target 
jumps to 100% and the average shortfall is equal to € 1172.
4 Section 2 assumes that realized wage growth and realized inflation are both 
equal to 0%, in line with expectations. This is indeed the simplest case. 
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3. Reporting monthly pension equivalent of accumulated asset
Our framework reports the projected amount of accumulated 
and capitalized contributions at retirement. This does not clearly 
inform beneficiaries on consumption possibilities, which is a 
central demand of plan members. This information is better 
conveyed by the replacement rate – i.e. the ratio of the annual 
pension annuity to wage.5 But replacement ratios are less clearly 
associated with fund performance and their determination is not 
straightforward in a DC world. Our proposal, which aims at easing 
long-term performance evaluation, thus focuses primarily on the 
projected amount of contributions.
 However, we do engage in the further step that consists of 
converting accumulated capital at retirement in a monthly 
pension pay. This will depend on the conversion rate between 
the capital at retirement and annuities, which in turn will be 
a function of a set of factors such as interest rates, mortality, 
transaction costs and fees, and so forth. It is also possible to 
contrast the possible pension annuity/drawdown profile with 
a desired pension payment, computed as a percentage of 
the current wage (i.e. a component of a replacement rate at 
retirement)6. This is shown in Appendix A1. This kind of reporting, 
based on further assumptions concerning the length of life after 
retirement, allows the pension member to assess the income/
5 Pension authorities use replacement ratios in order to communicate pension 
adequacy – for instance, in the Swedish “orange envelope”. 
6 It is also possible to highlight an alternative “annuities benchmark”. This is 
the conversion of the “real money-back” capital in an annuity, given an 
expected real interest rate and given the expected age of retirement. This 
benchmark is thus directly comparable with current wage.
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consumption possibilities, and their variability as a function of 
the interest rate that will prevail at retirement. 
 Appendix A2 takes an additional step, by explicitly modeling 
stochastic interest rates in order to show that particular kinds of 
asset allocation are able to contain the variability of consumption 
in response to interest rate shocks. Pension members who either 
must annuitize or choose to do so, may prefer a portfolio at 
retirement that is “conformable” with the annuities pay-out. 
Appendix A2 provides three reporting examples based on 
alternative asset allocations that differently immunize prospective 
annuities from interest rate volatility.
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4. Pension fund reporting, inflation and real wage growth
Sections 2 and 3 assume that realized wage growth and realized 
inflation are both equal to 0%, in line with expectations. This is 
the simplest possible case, but hides three issues. 
 First, realizations typically differ from expectations. Over time, 
such differences may become so large as to make projections 
no longer meaningful for the plan member. We suggest that 
such realizations be incorporated in the projection updates 
(i.e. in Figure 4 and subsequent figures) every year. Appendix B 
provides an example with positive realized wage growth, where 
contributions increase with real wages. It also allows for positive 
realized inflation. In order to make the projected pension pay 
bear a clear link to current pay, it is better to change the base year 
every year – rather than leaving it unchanged at t=0. 
 Second, a pension plan may use alternative expected wage 
growth or inflation scenarios. An alternative inflation scenario is 
irrelevant as long as inflation is non-stochastic (see the example 
in section 4.1. below). On the contrary, positive wage growth 
scenarios imply growing contributions, which increase benchmark 
capital at retirement. Alternative wage growth scenarios can thus 
be used, but they should always be compared to the conservative 
default option of zero expected growth. 
 Last but not least, previous sections assume non stochastic 
inflation – or, that inflation risk can be fully hedged at no cost. 
Such costs, should they occur, ought instead to be deducted from 
return projections. Moreover, projections understate the risk 
of asset allocations that are tilted towards imperfect inflation 
hedges such as long-term nominal bonds. Section 3.2 indicates 
the way to explicitly embed stochastic inflation into our reporting 
framework. We postpone until section 5.2 a discussion about 
stochastic wage growth.
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4.1 Non-Stochastic Inflation
Assume that the expected inflation rate is equal to 2% (ECB 
benchmark). If the inflation rate is non-stochastic, then it is 
perfectly anticipated. It follows that nominal returns on assets 
are equal to 7.5% for stocks and 4.5% for bonds, respectively with 
no change in real returns, volatility and correlation. The yearly 
nominal return, ensuring that the value of pension assets will be 
equal to the benchmark at retirement, is equal to 2.44%. With 
these changes, the average, maximum and minimum returns 
on accumulated assets roughly coincide with the ones described 
above, without inflation. 
4.2 Stochastic Inflation
Let us now assume that the inflation rate has non-zero volatility. 
This is going to increase (reduce) the expected real return on 
assets that are good (bad) inflation hedges, thus changing the 
range of possible outcomes at retirement in Figure 2. One way 
to account for this is to estimate a forecasting model where the 
distribution of asset returns is a function of the inflation rate, 
as in Campbell, Sunderam and Viceira (2013) or more simply in 
Briére et al. (2011) and Fugazza, Guidolin and Nicodano (2010). The 
reporting scheme should not otherwise be affected by stochastic 
inflation. Even if realized inflation differs from what had been 
expected, both ex post performance and revised projections are a 
function of real variables only. A higher-than- expected inflation 
will depress the realized real return on pension assets below the 
expected outcomes, if these assets are not good inflation hedges; 
and will require higher nominal contributions in order to keep 
projected contributions constant in real terms.
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5. Discussion
Our framework provides an example of a reporting standard 
based on relatively straightforward calculation rules that can be 
performed by pension plans and understood by plan members. 
 It should by now be clear that the framework is rather 
flexible, in that it can accommodate alternative communication 
frameworks (future pension assets or monthly pension 
equivalent) and alternative inflation and growth scenarios. It is 
also possible to use the reporting framework as a tool to simulate 
the consequences of competing choices by the plan member. 
For instance, a worker may ask to have her exposure to the stock 
market reduced after negative performance, such as the one 
portrayed in Figure 3. Availability of this reporting method makes 
if possible to illustrate new projections associated with a more 
defensive asset allocation. A comparison of the two reveals that 
lower risk entails lower upside potential. 
 This section, and in particular sections 5.1-5.4, discusses our 
choices against alternatives that would imply more substantial 
departures from the current simple settings.
 
5.1 An alternative benchmark
The purchasing power of a future pension is what matters to a 
prospective retiree. Along these lines, Bodie and Treussard (2007) 
assume that contributions are invested in a maturity matched 
inflation-indexed bond at time 0, whose principal value is 
indexed to the CPI and pays, additionally, a coupon. This way, it 
is possible to get rid of all (but insolvency) risks. They also suggest 
using IIB as a performance benchmark. In our framework, some 
real interest rate risk would still be present because contributions 
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are invested throughout the life cycle (not just at t=0), and the 
rate on IIB that prevails in the future is unknown. 
 We opt instead for a benchmark with zero real return, which 
is compared with a net-of-fee return on pension assets under 
management. The rationale behind this proposal is the following. 
First, a CPI benchmark is easy to understand and communicate. 
Second, this benchmark has the desirable property of being 
achievable in normal circumstances of positive real interest 
rates, at least where there is a market for IIB, and also given 
that, historically, equities have provided positive real returns 
over longer periods. On the contrary, efficient benchmarks 
(with no transaction costs and no fees) on average beat the 
performance of net-of-fee asset managers by definition, and 
are therefore unattainable for the majority of the industry, thus 
generating possible misunderstandings with investors. Inefficient 
benchmarks such as stock indexes may be hard to beat in practice 
because of regulatory restrictions that prevent managers from 
investing outside the benchmark asset menu.
 Third, beating the CPI benchmark, while possible, is not 
straightforward. Markets for inflation-linked bonds are absent in 
some countries. Even where they exist, there may be discontinuity 
in the coverage of the yield curve, so that inflation cannot be 
hedged at all horizons without bearing some market risk or 
without special circumstances pushing bond markets into a 
negative real yields territory. Furthermore, covering inflation plus 
management costs remains a challenge in itself, especially when 
the time-to-retirement is short. 
 The solution we propose here, besides being driven by a search 
for simplicity, is one that is able to satisfy the various parties 
involved: the investors, who would receive a fair representation of 
expected retirement capital in real terms; the industry, which may 
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be willing to adopt this reporting standard because it is offered 
an attainable benchmark; and the regulators, because this is 
consistent with investor protection principles.
5.2 A life-cycle approach
In our model, contributions grow together with the realized wage 
growth. A more complex, but welfare-enhancing, contribution 
profile connects contributions to the plan member's income and 
family composition, in such a way that contributions constrain 
less the consumption of young families and weigh more on older 
and richer families. Research on optimal life-cycle savings and 
investments (Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein, 2007; Bodie 
Detemple and Rindisbacher, 2009; Bodie, Merton and Samuelson, 
1992; Campbell et al., 2001; Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout, 2005; 
Gomes, Kotlikoff and Viceira,2008; and Koijen, Nijman and 
Werker, 2010 and Bagliano et al., 2012) provides the logical 
background for computing consumption-smoothing contribution 
paths that are able to improve on the investor’s welfare.
 Life-cycle research also recognizes that an investor’s total 
wealth, and the risk she bears is derived not only from financial 
returns but from labor income as well. In certain countries, labor 
income gives rise to pension wealth in the form of first-pillar 
entitlements. Ideally, then, Figures 2, 3 and 4 ought to portray the 
possible values of total accumulated assets, which may include 
also first-pillar entitlements. To the extent that such financial and 
labor incomes are not perfectly correlated, bad (good) financial 
shocks are compensated by good (bad) labor income shocks. This 
reasoning implies that the variability of total accumulated assets 
is likely to be smaller than that of pension fund assets only. Our 
proposal sidesteps this approach, in order to focus more closely 
defined contribution pension plans 29
on pension fund reporting, and hence financial wealth generated 
by pension funds.
 Last but not least, the life-cycle theory emphasizes that 
what matters to individual investors is not only the level of 
consumption but its smoothing as well: i.e. the possibility 
to maintain consumption levels over time. This implies that 
performance assessment of pension funds should be based 
on their ability to smooth consumption during retirement 
years (as suggested in Bagliano, Fugazza and Nicodano, 2010). 
This performance dimension is not captured by our proposal, 
as represented in Figures 2, 3, 4 and 6. The next subsection 
addresses how might be taken a step in that direction.
5.3 Return predictability and rebalancing of contributions
Our assumption of independent returns over time has several 
implications. On the one hand, it implies that future returns 
cannot be predicted on the basis of past realized returns, or past 
realized inflation, and so forth. Moreover, our assumption implies 
that there is no gain from active portfolio management. Finally, 
the annualized conditional variance of returns is independent of 
the investor’s horizon. 
 There is, however, a large literature on return predictability, 
which shows that lagged returns, the inflation rate, the dividend-
price ratio, the term premium and the default premium can 
explain current equity, real estate, bond and especially T-bill 
returns in in-sample experiments. Predictability impacts on 
optimal portfolio management, creating a difference between 
long- term and short-term management. Indeed, if returns on 
equities (bonds) are mean reverting (averting), then the equity 
(bond) annualized volatility over a long horizon is lower (higher) 
than the annualized volatility over a short horizon. An optimal 
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long-run portfolio entails a higher (lower) equity (bond) share 
than a short-term one does (Campbell and Viceira, 2005; Fugazza, 
Guidolin and Nicodano, 2007). However, there is no consensus, 
yet, as to whether these patterns are useful for improving future 
portfolio performance relative to simpler strategies (Goyal and 
Welch, 2008; Fugazza, Guidolin and Nicodano, 2010), or whether 
it is necessary to resort to more elaborate prediction models. 
This is why we stick to the simplest return representation which 
can, however, be changed without prejudice to the rest of the 
proposal.
 Our projections also keep the yearly contribution insensitive to 
realized returns. The projections could instead allow for increases 
in contributions after lower than-expected returns7. In this case, 
this feature should be incorporated also when building the ex 
ante accumulated assets projections. This dynamic “contribution 
rebalancing” strategy would yield better outcomes if portfolio 
returns were negatively correlated over time at the yearly 
frequency.
5.4 Parameter uncertainty and forecast reliability
Our reporting framework assumes that forecasts are reliable, that 
the distribution of asset returns has known parameters (mean, 
variance-covariance matrix). On the contrary, these parameters 
are usually estimated from the data with error. Usually, such 
errors affect comparatively riskier assets more than safer assets. 
Moreover they compound over time, making long-term forecasts 
of riskier assets extremely imprecise. In turn, this implies that 
long term risk-averse investors are less attracted by riskier assets 
7 Besides, during periods of dramatic declines in equities prices, participants 
may not be willing to increase contributions fearing for the continuation of 
their jobs.
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more than short-term investors are, when they become aware of 
this added uncertainty (see Barberis, 2000; Fugazza, Guidolin and 
Nicodano, 2009). Our reporting framework omits the modeling 
of such estimation error, thus implicitly understating the risk of 
riskier assets the more so, the longer the horizon. More generally, 
we do not provide any measure of the reliability of the forecast.
5.5 Outsourcing return forecasts used in projections?
Projections rely on the distribution of returns on several asset 
classes. In our proposal, these are chosen by each pension fund 
on the grounds that each could have views on asset prospects 
that motivate their proposed asset allocation. At the same time, 
incentives to boost returns in order to attract new members 
should be mitigated by the knowledge that disappointed 
members are likelier to leave the fund ex post. This mitigation 
may not work if managers have short horizons and there are 
short-term performance fees. In such a case the industry 
association may provide return forecasts to all pension funds. This 
also preserves comparability of performance across pension funds.
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6. Concluding comments
DC pension funds currently project expected benefits at retirement 
in a very limited set of countries, using either no risk scenario 
or a very limited number of scenarios. Our reporting framework 
projects the distribution of outcomes at retirement associated 
with a large number of scenarios, thus making the plan member 
aware of both the upside potential and the downside risk. This 
is in line with the desire of supervisory authorities, which are 
not only aware of the importance of projections, but also stress 
the need to convey to plan members the level of uncertainty 
surrounding expected benefits (OECD, 2010b; Rinaldi, and 
Giacomel, 2008). 
 Another concern of the authorities has to do with the conflict 
of interest between fund members and pension providers, 
exacerbated by the poor understanding of the impact of cost and 
fees (Rinaldi and Giacomel, 2008). We address this problem as 
follows. First, we propose associating projections with the asset 
allocation chosen by the plan member, so as to make her aware 
of the higher risks associated with larger equity investments. 
Second, the plan member is able to assess ex-post pension fund 
performance against the latter previous projections, so as to curb 
the incentives to overstate future returns and pension benefits. 
Third, the return on the money-back-benchmark is cost-free, 
thus implicitly putting an upper bound on charges. Thus the plan 
member can grasp the additional costs and downside risks of 
alternatives to the “money-back” benchmark at retirement. At 
the same time, this reporting framework has advantages for the 
industry as well, especially in terms of fair comparability with the 
benchmark and simple and effective communication. Indeed, the 
plan member also understands the costs of lower risk strategies 
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in terms of foregone upside potential. Secondly, reports do not 
emphasize poor ex-post pension plan performance until the 
real return, net of costs, falls below zero. Finally, a longer-term 
assessment may mitigate the pension member’s reaction to poor 
short-term performance, which often results in withdrawals in 
bear markets. 
 A final concern of regulators has to do with the actual framing 
of reports so as to ensure they are understood by plan members 
(OECD, 2010b). While this proposal does not address this issue in 
detail, we wish to stress that we limit the amount of information, 
knowing that too much information is equivalent to none. 
Indeed, we envisage the regular distribution of only two figures 
and tables with explanatory notes to all members. A website 
should contain information on assumptions, on the chosen asset 
allocation as well as disclaimers. More work on this aspect is 
postponed to future drafts.
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Table I
The Assumptions Underlying Projections
The table reports assumptions concerning the parameters listed 
in the first column. Percentage returns and growth rates are 
annualized. The real returns on equity and bonds are assumed to 
be jointly log-normally distributed, and IID over time.
Mean Standard 
Deviation
Inflation Rate (π) 0 
Real Returns on 10-year Duration Govt. Bonds 2.5 3.0
Real Equity Returns 5.5 18
Bond-Equity Return Correlation 0.1 //
Inter-temporal Return Correlation 0 //
Yearly Real Wage Growth Rate (w) 0 0
Monthly Contribution 100
Percentage Transaction Costs on New Contributions 0.5
Percentage Yearly Fee on Assets Under Management 0.4
Rebalancing Costs 0
Tax rates 0
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Figure 1
Asset allocation
This figure explains to the worker the chosen asset allocation and 
how it evolves during life. In this example, the allocation entails 
20% in bonds and 80% in stocks, with quarterly rebalancing.
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Figure 2
Projected pension assets at age 25
This is the figure the worker sees when joining the pension fund 
at age 25. It reports projected pension assets from age 25 to age 
65, when yearly contributions equal € 1,200. The benchmark “your 
money-back”, which corresponds to a zero real rate of return, 
appears in black. Mean accumulated assets appear in white. The 
asset allocation entails 20% in bonds and 80% in stocks, with 
quarterly rebalancing.
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Table II
Key projected outcomes at 25
The first column reports statistics relating to shortfall risk. The first 
row indicates the probability of not reaching the “money-back” 
benchmark after 40 years. The second, fourth and fifth rows 
indicate the average, maximum and minimum euro shortfall 
with respect to the benchmark. The second column shows the 
average, maximum and minimum accumulated assets. The last 
four rows indicate upper and lower percentile boundary figures 
for accumulated assets. 
 Risk of not reaching 
benchmark after 
accumulation phase
Amount of assets after 
accumulation phase 
(40 years)
Probability 3.35%  
Average -6,772.41 177,597.05
st.dev 5,361.47 137,020.73
Maximum -23,299.75 1,735,955.07
Minimum -72.97 24,747.04
 5 % distr. upper bound   409,432.80 
1 5% distr. upper bound   273,318.78 
15% distr. lower bound   76,519.86 
 5% distr. lower bound   53,064.12 
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Figure 3
Realized and projected pension assets at age 26
This figure allows the worker to assess the yearly performance of 
her pension fund at age 26. It highlights with a white square, the 
actual ex-post accumulated assets against projected ones. In the 
picture both the white and black benchmarks are highlighted. 
Figure 4
Projected retirement assets at age 26
This figure allows a 26-year-old worker to project her assets to 
age 65, conditional on one-year actual performance. Both the 
black and the white benchmark appear clearly. 
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Table III
Key projected outcomes at 26
The first column reports statistics relating to shortfall risk one 
year later. The first row indicates the probability of not reaching 
the “money-back” benchmark after 39 years. The second, fourth 
and fifth rows indicate the average, maximum and minimum 
euro shortfall with respect to the benchmark. The second column 
shows the average, maximum and minimum accumulated assets. 
The last four rows indicate upper and lower percentile boundary 
figures for accumulated assets. 
 Risk of not reaching 
benchmark after 
accumulation phase
Amount of assets after 
accumulation phase 
(39 years)
Probability 3.80%  
Average -7,886.28 179,392.88
st.dev 5,546.26 144,923.19
Maximum -23,820.32 2,274,260.18
Minimum -111.64 24,221.01
 5 % distr. upper bound   425,976.47 
1 5% distr. upper bound   279,918.53 
15% distr. lower bound   74,447.81 
 5% distr. lower bound   51,211.86 
44 design paper 22
defined contribution pension plans 45
Appendix A: Sensitivity to interest rate volatility
A.1 Communicating Monthly Pension Equivalent of Accumulated 
Assets
In this section we translate the results portrayed in Figure 2, which 
are expressed in terms of total accumulated assets into annuities 
(i.e. into an equivalent monthly pay received after retirement). 
This kind of reporting best suits those systems that partially 
or fully annuitize DC pension benefits. Even for systems where 
annuitization is not mandatory, this reporting method makes it 
possible to have a representation of the expected replacement 
rate of a DC plan in terms of current wages.
 In the examples that follow we will assume a life expectancy 
of 20 years post-retirement.8 Moreover, we allow for 10 possible 
levels of conversion rates at retirement, which we use to convert 
real accumulated capital into a monthly real annuity. Conversion 
rates depend essentially on life expectancy and real interest rates. 
In our examples, life expectancy is fixed; thus, the variability of 
conversion rates depends on possible alternative real interest 
rates. We therefore convert each of the 2,000 simulated levels 
of accumulated capital above, using alternative interest rates. 
We start with a 1% real interest rate, and we average the 2,000 
possible pays to achieve a monthly average pay of € 816.40. And 
we repeat this exercise for the other possible interest rates. 
 The table below shows all the results of the average monthly 
pension during retirement. It ranges from € 816.40 when the 
interest rate is as low as 1%, to € 1,663.44 for a high level of the 
interest rate-clearly displaying the sensitivity of pension income 
to the rate.
8 Users of this reporting scheme may refer to mortality tables (conditional on 
country, age, sex …) to get better estimates. 
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Communication can be further improved by highlighting the 
desired monthly pension as a percentage of the current wage. The 
grey line in the figure below shows the desired monthly pension 
per month, set at Euro € 875,00.9 
 The darkest columns show the average monthly pay, as 
reported in Table A1. We now see that the average pension 
would not be sufficient to match the desired income in some 
interest rate environments. Unless another source of pension 
wage is present, a participant may therefore want to increase her 
contribution. Figure A1 also displays the average “+ 1 standard 
deviation” and the average “- 1 standard deviation” pension, 
respectively labeled better and worse. The graph now makes clear 
that only better return scenarios allow the investor participant to 
hit the desired replacement rate when interest rate is low. As in 
Figure 2, the black line indicates the real money-back benchmark, 
converted into monthly annuity payments, which rises with 
higher real interest rates. A conservative participant may even 
want to limit the projected gap between the two lines by raising 
monthly contributions during the accumulation phase.
 A problem with these representations is that the pension 
fund, which is responsible for the reports we are addressing, may 
9 In the Netherlands, the most common wage (modus) is about € 35,000 a year. 
If we take 30% of this wage (which roughly accounts for the Dutch second-
pillar part of retirement pay) and divide by 12 we get € 875.00.
Table A1 
Monthly pension equivalent of accumulated capital at retirement
This table reports the level of the real interest rate at retirement in the first row, and the 
associated average monthly pension pay in the second row.
1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10%
816.40 896.91 981.35 1,069.52 1,161.19 1,256.13 1,354.08 1,454.79 1,557.99 1,663.44
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not be able to control the terms of annuity provision. A second 
difficulty is that inflation protected annuities, like the ones 
portrayed in Table A1 and Figure A1, are very seldom marketed by 
insurance companies. 
Figure A1
Simulated and desired pension payments, deterministic interest 
rates and money-back benchmark
This figure reports the level of the real interest rate at retirement 
on the horizontal axis, and the monthly pension on the vertical 
one. The grey line indicates desired monthly pension, the darkest 
bars the average monthly pension, the darker and lighter bars 
a worse and better outcomes (respectively corresponding to the 
average minus/plus one standard deviation). In line with Figure 
2, the black line indicates the real money-back benchmark, 
converted into monthly annuity payments, which rises with 
higher real interest rates. 
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A.2 Stochastic interest rates
The previous figure assumes ten exogenous interest rate levels. 
Of course, interest rates are not equally likely. Moreover, one 
should also account for the impact of realized interest rates on 
bond values. This would open up the possibility for a pension 
fund to show the effects of a different asset allocation, one which 
gradually invests in long-term bonds over the accumulation 
phase, on pension payment sensitivity to the interest rate. 
Figure A2
Projected pension assets at age 25 with stochastic interest rate
This figure is the counterpart of Figure 2, when the interest rate 
is simulated instead of the bond return. It reports projected 
pension assets from age 25 to age 65, when yearly contributions 
equal € 1,200. The money-back benchmark appears in black. Mean 
accumulated assets appear in white. The asset allocation entails 
20% in bonds and 80% in stocks, with quarterly rebalancing.
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Table A2 
Key projected outcomes at age 25 with stochastic interest rate
This table is the counterpart of Table II, when the interest rate is 
simulated instead of the bond return. The first column reports 
statistics relating to shortfall risk. The first row indicates the 
probability of not reaching the “money-back” benchmark after 
40 years. The second, fourth and fifth rows indicate the average, 
maximum and minimum euro shortfall with respect to the 
benchmark. The second column shows the average, maximum 
and minimum accumulated assets. The last four rows indicate 
upper and lower percentile boundary figures for accumulated 
assets. 
Risk of not reaching 
benchmark after 
accumulation phase
Amount of assets after 
accumulation phase 
(40 years)
Probability 3.35%
Average -7,212.73 181,531.67
st.dev 5,261.22 133,676.06
Maximum -23,432.69 1,524,056.49
Minimum -58.02 24,614.10
 5 % distr. upper bound  430,144.39 
1 5% distr. upper bound  287,072.19 
15% distr. lower bound  77,008.42 
 5% distr. lower bound  52,425.33 
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Figure A3
Simulated and desired pension payments, stochastic interest rates 
and money-back benchmark
This figure is the counterpart of Figure A1, when the interest rate 
is simulated instead of the bond return. It shows the level of 
the real interest rate at retirement on the horizontal axis, and 
the monthly pension on the vertical one. The grey line indicates 
desired monthly pension, the dots the simulated monthly 
pension payments. The black line indicates the real money-back 
annuity benchmark. The asset allocation entails 20% in bonds 
and 80% in stocks, with quarterly rebalancing.
 In other terms, the pension provider may want to immunize 
prospective annuities from interest rates shocks, by “locking 
in” the portfolio prospective capitals needed for annuity 
payments. This can be done with bonds of similar maturity as 
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annuity payments. But before getting into effective examples of 
immunization, we would like to analyze the impact of interest 
rate volatility.
 To this end, we repeat the exercise we performed in the main 
body of the paper, simulating the real interest rate on five-year 
duration bonds rather than the return on bonds. The interest rate 
distribution is assumed to be lognormal with constant mean of 
2.2% and volatility of 1%. The correlation between equity returns 
and interest rates is assumed to be low in absolute value and 
negative (-0.1). Figure A2 and Table A2 are a fairly close replication 
of Figure 2 and Table II, based on interest rate instead of bond 
total return simulation. Figure A3 portrays instead the simulated 
pension wage scenarios against realized interest rates. Now 
we see that higher interest rate scenarios are less likely than 
intermediate ones, and cases of negative real rates appear. In 
comparison to Figure A1, it reveals that most scenarios end up 
below benchmark even at intermediate rates of 4%-5%, and 
that some high average payments in Figure A1 may actually be 
associated with outliers. 
 Importantly, the simulation of interest rates makes it possible 
to investigate whether alternative asset allocations better hedge 
interest rate risk at retirement, while still beating the benchmark. 
For instance, we may wonder whether an equity glide path, 
which progressively substitutes constant duration bonds to stocks, 
is a better hedge against interest rate variation.
 Figure A4 portrays the glide path. Figure A5 shows that the 
glide path substantially reduces very high and very low outcomes 
for accumulated assets, which is mirrored in a reduction in 
both shortfall probability and average accumulated assets. The 
following Figure A6 highlights that the glide path does not really 
help in shrinking interest rate sensitivity of pension income.
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 To complete our investigation, we experiment with a20% 
equity, 80% five-year duration bonds allocation. Asset projections 
(see Figure A7) now reveal that shortfall risk is eliminated together 
with the upside potential. The impact on monthly pension 
payment is dramatic. Interest rate risk is hedged quite well, 
as the sensitivity of the monthly pension payment is very low. 
However the level of the pension payment is almost always below 
the desired pension payment. Thus, a clear trade-off emerges 
between reduced exposure to interest rates and upside potential. 
 The choice of asset allocation depends on the choice of pension 
associates and provider. However, our reporting framework 
allows us to choose a “conformable” accumulation solution 
as a function of the nature of decumulation (fully annuitized, 
partly annuitized, based on capital drawdowns) and the life 
expectancy at retirement. Plan members that are forced to 100% 
annuitization will be more inclined to favor hedging of interest 
rate risk rather than trying to beat the benchmark.
Figure A4
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Figure A5
Projected pension assets at age 25
This figure is the counterpart of Figure A2, when the asset 
allocation entails a gradual reduction of the equity share from 
age 45 onwards, as represented in Figure A4. It reports projected 
pension assets from age 25 to age 65, when yearly contributions 
equal € 1,200. The money-back benchmark appears in black. Mean 
accumulated assets appear in white. 
Table A3
Key projected outcomes at age 25
This table is the counterpart of Table A2, when the asset allocation 
entails a glide path, as indicated in Figure A4.
Risk of not reaching 
benchmark after 
accumulation phase
Amount of assets after 
accumulation phase 
(40 years)
Probability 1.75%  
Average -5,190.38 146,581.34
st.dev 3,679.39 97,302.15
Maximum -16,320.79 1,217,730.29
Minimum -702.63 31,726.00
 5 % distr. upper bound   327,911.80 
15% distr. upper bound   212,211.74 
15% distr. lower bound   74,520.50 
 5% distr. lower bound   59,545.56 
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A.3 Conformable portfolios
This section provides other examples of portfolios that immunize, 
in varying degrees, the participant from interest rate volatility in 
the accumulation phase. The pension member, with the help of 
these projections, can choose the portfolio that best fits her needs 
of immunizing prospective annuities from interest rate volatility.
A.3.1 100% matching annuities with bonds immunization in the 
accumulation phase 
In this first example, contributions are invested in zero coupon 
bonds or swaps of decreasing maturity so as to provide 100% 
matching– as indicated in Figure A6. In Figure A7, the black line 
indicates the money-back (€ 48,000 in this case) benchmark. 
The dots form an almost flat line, indicating that the interest 
rate sensitivity of the monthly pension payment is minimal. 
It is apparent that the dots are always below the money-back 
benchmark in black. Thus, this appears unattainable with this 
asset allocation, since there are no equities and therefore no 
benefit from the equity risk premium. This is equally evident in 
Table A4, which reports statistics concerning accumulated assets 
at retirement. The probability of not reaching the benchmark is 1. 
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Figure A6 
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Figure A7 
Simulated and desired pension payments, stochastic interest rates 
and money-back benchmark
This figure is the counterpart of Figure A3, with stochastic interest 
rate, when the asset allocation entails 100% maturity matching, 
as indicated in Figure A6.
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Table A4
Key projected outcomes at age 25
This table is the counterpart of Table A2, when the asset allocation 
entails 100% maturity matching, as indicated in Figure A6.
 Risk of not reaching 
target after acc. 
Phase
Amount of assets after 
accumulation phase 
(40 years)
Probability 100.00%  
Average -12,322.52 35,724.27
st.dev 3,072.01 3,072.01
Maximum -20,366.60 47,892.44
Minimum -154.35 27,680.19
 5 % distr. upper bound  41,074.68 
15% distr. upper bound   38,913.79 
15% distr. lower bound   32,540.92 
 5% distr. lower bound   30,889.37 
A.3.2 Constant 20% equity exposure and bonds immunization 
during accumulation.
In this second example, 20% of the portfolio is invested in 
equities, so as to take advantage of the risk premium, while the 
rest provides immunization from interest rate volatility (see Figure 
A8). Figure A9 shows that expected pension payments are now 
both more sensitive to the interest rate, but it is more likely that 
the money-back benchmark is attained thanks to partial equity 
exposure. 
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Figure A8
Figure A9
Simulated and desired pension payments, stochastic interest rates 
and money-back benchmark
This figure is the counterpart of Figure A7 when the asset 
allocation is the one depicted in Figure A8. Note the different 
scale on the vertical axis.
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A.3.3 Dynamic optimization with equities and bonds 
immunization during accumulation 
In this last example the exposure to equities is much higher and 
portfolio immunization with respect to expected annuities starts 
later, at age 45. The equity risk premium allows the participant to 
have higher expected returns but of course implies a broader risk 
cone. An alternative representation of Figure A11, which echoes 
Figure A1, is given in Figure A12.
Figure A10 
Dynamic glide path
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Figure A11 
Simulated and desired pension payments, stochastic interest rates 
and money-back benchmark
This figure is the counterpart of Figure A7 when the asset 
allocation is the glide path depicted in Figure A10.
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Figure A12 
Simulated and desired pension payments, stochastic interest rates 
and money-back benchmark
This figure is the counterpart of Figure A1, when the real interest 
rate is stochastic. The real interest rate at retirement is on the 
horizontal axis, and the monthly pension on the vertical one. The 
the asset allocation is the glide path depicted in Figure A10.
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Appendix B: Communicating projections and performance 
results in current euros
The hypothesis of zero real wage growth is not a necessary 
component of our model.10 We now assume a 2% real wage 
growth forecast for the next 40 years, which sets the money-back 
benchmark at € 73,023.75.
Table B1
Contribution per month per person invested 100.00
Percentage Real Wage growth per year 2.00%
Investment horizon 40 year
Benchmark capital, in t=0 Euro 73,023.75
Pay-out time annuity 20 year
Real Return low-risk assets 2.5%
Real Risk low-risk assets 3.0%
Real Return high-return assets 5.5%
Risk high-return assets 18.0%
Correlation 10%
Asset allocation low-risk assets 20%
Asset allocation high-return assets 80%
Start capital (t=0) 0.00
Of course the model can also be run with alternative hypotheses. 
Moreover, all of the results can be translated into monthly annuity 
equivalents as shown in the previous Appendix A. What matters 
is to (a) keep the same scenario as in the previous year, when 
evaluating ex post performance (b), revising the inputs for the 
new projections, on the basis of realized inflation and wage 
10 The industry association that promotes the reporting standard among its 
members may choose the institution providing the inflation and wage 
forecasts, as well as the ex post figures, to all pension funds. 
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growth. 10 We use a negative real wage growth case in the next 
section, where we address the issue of the effect of inflation on 
“re-basing” the projections from one year to the next.
B.1 Rebasing projections year after year and the effect of 
inflation
Reports expressed in terms of constant purchasing power may 
no longer bear a correspondence with current purchasing power 
of plan members after some years, in inflationary scenarios. This 
section explains how to change the base year so as to report in 
current euro, accounting for non-neutral inflation effects.
 Suppose CPI inflation, between t=0 and t=1, equaled 3.0%. 
That means that our original benchmark capital should be 
raised to € 73,023.75 x 1.03 = € 75,214.46 in order to keep the real 
benchmark constant. If inflation had been anticipated so that 
nominal returns were 3% higher than the real one; and if wage 
inflation had also been equal to 3%, due to indexation, then 
contributions as a share of nominal wage will also increase to 103. 
Thus there would only be nominal changes. 
 Realized inflation affects instead real projected outcomes if 
returns and incomes do not grow proportionally with inflation, 
i.e., when contracts are not perfectly indexed and/or inflation is 
unexpected.11 
 For instance, assume nominal wage growth is only 2% instead 
of 3% between t=0 and t=1. This implies that real contributions 
(rebased in year 1) will now be equal to 102.00 per month, unless 
the plan member decides to save a higher share of his real 
income. So the new set of inputs for the projections, with base 
year t=1, are the ones in the table below.
11 This is the case also if the tax system, which relies on nominal income, is 
progressive. For the sake of simplicity, we set the tax rate to zero.
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Table B2
The table reports the values of the parameters listed in the first 
column, expressed in t=1 Euro. Figures that differ from the ones 
in Table B1 are in bold. Percentage returns and growth rates are 
annualized. The real returns on equity and bonds are assumed to 
be jointly log-normally distributed, and IID over time.
Contribution per month per person invested 102.00
Percentage Real Wage growth per year (expected) 2.00%
Investment horizon 39 year
Benchmark capital, in t=1 Euro with no erosion in year 0
Benchmark capital in t=1 given erosion in year 0
75,214.47
 73,009.79.
Pay-out time annuity 20 year
Real Return low-risk assets 2.5%
Real Risk low-risk assets 3.0%
Real Return high-return assets 5.5%
Risk high-return assets 18.0%
Correlation 10%
Asset allocation low-risk assets 20%
Asset allocation high-return assets 80%
Start capital (t=1) 1,195.00
 With the inputs stated above, projected accumulated assets 
at retirement as a result of contributions, wage growth and 
investment horizon are equal to € 73,009.79. Therefore the higher 
benchmark capital of € 75,214.47 (0.1703%) requires a higher return 
on investments. This adds to the gross return on investment 
needed to compensate for yearly AUM fees and transaction costs, 
which become 0.599% from 0.43%. In other words, inflation 
has reduced the real value of contributions, and this also raises 
the risk of not reaching this benchmark, as displayed in Table B3 
below. 
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Table B3
Risk of not reaching 
benchmark after 
accumulation phase
Amount of assets after 
accumulation phase 
(39 years)
Probability 3.60%
Average -13,986.61 249,033.30
st.dev 10,755.33 185,924.08
Maximum -41,852.74 2,214,411.14
Minimum -156.64 34,841.41
 5 % distr. upper bound  596,440.68 
15% distr. upper bound  373,717.35 
15% distr. lower bound  110,889.78 
 5% distr. lower bound  82,086.59 
Notice that the plan member may want to consider raising her 
monthly contributions in order to increase the chance of reaching 
her desired pension wage. If she increases, at t=1, her monthly 
contribution to 120, benchmark capital becomes 85,682.99. 
Table B4
Risk of not reaching 
benchmark after 
accumulation phase
Amount of assets 
after accumulation 
phase (39 years)
Probability 3.65%
Average -14,675.33 284,369.41
st.dev 11,727.50 193,188.74
Maximum -41,270.85 1,854,148.70
Minimum -68.90 46,122.94
 5 % distr. upper bound 661,641.84
15% distr. upper bound 439,363.17
15% distr. lower bound 129,111.85
 5% distr. lower bound 92,575.40
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A reporting standard for defined 
contribution pension plans
Pension regulators stress the need for plan members to 
receive information allowing them to monitor their future 
pension wealth and the investment risk they bear. This 
paper by Kees de Vaan (Syntrus Achmea), Daniele Fano 
(Tor Vergata University), Herialt Mens (Aegon) and Giovanna 
Nicodano (University of Turin) proposes a simple method 
for projecting DC pension benefits at retirement on a yearly 
basis, which may be a building block towards an industry 
reporting standard. They discuss two reporting formats, one 
based on accumulated capital at retirement and the other 
on monthly pension wage.
